Our Freedom is Always Limited![\"\"](\"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/05\/Free-will-or-determinism-300x194.png\")
<\/strong><\/h3>\nSome people think “freedom” means “the ability to do anything.” So they reject the view. Few if any scholars who affirm free will believe this, however.<\/p>\n
Human freedom is always limited. It\u2019s constrained, conditioned, or framed by many sources, both internal and external to the actor. But all humans act as if they are free, even if some deny this verbally.<\/p>\n
To be free is to choose, in a particular moment, among a limited number of relevant options. We freely choose as a source or cause of our actions. Free creatures could have chosen something other than what they chose; they could have done otherwise.[1]<\/a><\/p>\nI don’t know with certainty that all humans have limited but genuine free will. Absolute certainty about such matters is illusory. Certainty is rare!<\/p>\n
But I\u2019m more confident about my freedom than I am about descriptions of humans or even of existence. I\u2019m confident about about free will, because I experience it personally. And I presuppose its veracity in the way I live my life.<\/p>\n
We Should Start with the Data We Know Best<\/strong><\/h3>\nWe often make mistakes and don’t know much if anything with certainty. So we should have some method in our attempts to make sense of life.<\/p>\n
The philosopher Roderick Chisholm recommends what he calls \u201cepistemological particularism.\u201d[2]<\/a> This method privileges experiences we know best when trying to makes sense of life. It begins with ideas that seem most obvious.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/03\/41u3sYlYC3L._SX331_BO1204203200_-200x300.jpg\")
See my essay in this…<\/p><\/div>\n
Epistemological particularism doesn\u2019t claim we can be certain descriptions of our experience are 100% accurate. But we can be more confident in first-person data — especially data inevitably expressed in our living — than data we know from a third-person perspective.<\/p>\n
This method should lead us to affirm the reality of human freedom. Of course, some people interpret studies in neuroscience (and other sciences) as indicating humans are not free. For several reasons, I think such interpretations mistaken. But my first step in addressing claims about determinism is to argue we should feel more confident of the truthfulness of first-person data \u2013 our inescapable personal experiences \u2013 than the data of neuroscience. Scientists obtain neuroscience data through third-person perspectives.<\/p>\n
I\u2019m not rejecting neuroscience as a discipline. In my view, neuroscientists should pursue their research with passion. The discipline has generated helpful insights, and I have friends contributing in this field. But we must avoid conclusions the data does not and, I think, could not in principle support. For an accessible philosophical defense of freewill in light of neuroscience research, see Alfred Mele’s work.[3]<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\nIs Free Will Just Common Sense?<\/strong><\/h3>\nSome call those beliefs that are self-evidently true and inevitably expressed in our actions \u201ccommon sense.\u201d Philosophers such as Thomas Reid, GE Moore, and Alfred North Whitehead argued for commonsense ideas.[4]<\/a> In terms of freedom, common sense says we all act freely — at least sometimes.<\/p>\nWe use \u201ccommon sense\u201d\u00a0 to describe ideas that are not inevitably expressed in our lives, however. To some people, for instance, it’s common sense black men should not marry white women. Others think it’s common sense that the New England Patriots are the greatest football team. Some think common sense tells us God controls our lives. Because these ideas are not truly common nor expressed inevitably in our actions, the phrase “common sense” can be misleading and then dismissed as unhelpful or dangerous.<\/p>\n
David Ray Griffin distinguishes between ideas some call common sense and what he calls \u201chard-core\u201d and soft-core commonsense ideas.[5]<\/a> We inevitably presuppose hard-core commonsense ideas in our practice. We don\u2019t inevitably presuppose soft-core commonsense ideas. Soft-core commonsense ideas might include the (wrong) belief that black men and white women shouldn\u2019t marry, the (debatable) belief that New England has the best football team, or the (arguably harmful) belief that God controls creation.<\/p>\nWe can deny soft-core commonsense ideas and still live consistently. Hard-core commonsense ideas cannot consistently be denied in our practice.<\/p>\n
Free Will is an Experiential Nonnegotiable<\/strong><\/h3>\nI\u2019ve come to call the ideas that we inescapably live out \u201cexperiential nonnegotiables.\u201d We must accept the truth of experiential nonnegotiables if we want to speak adequately about the way the world works.<\/p>\n
We contradict ourselves if we say we act one way and then act differently. We commit what J\u00fcrgen Habermas calls \u201cperformative contradictions:\u201d our performance in life contradicts our statements about what life is like.[6]<\/a><\/p>\nIn terms of freedom, we contradict ourselves if we claim we are not free and then live as if we act freely<\/em>. Our words don\u2019t match our actions; we are experiential hypocrites. At least for most humans if not all, genuine but limited freedom is an experiential nonnegotiable.<\/p>\nI could list other experiential nonnegotiables (e.g., there is a world external to myself). Myy point for this essay is the inevitable experience of freedom in our lives provides strong justification to think humans have genuine but limited freedom.<\/p>\nWe contradict ourselves if we claim we're not free and then live as if we act freely. We are experiential hypocrites. <\/a><\/span>Share on X<\/a><\/span>\n
I don’t know with certainty that all humans have limited but genuine free will. Absolute certainty about such matters is illusory. Certainty is rare!<\/p>\n
But I\u2019m more confident about my freedom than I am about descriptions of humans or even of existence. I\u2019m confident about about free will, because I experience it personally. And I presuppose its veracity in the way I live my life.<\/p>\n
We Should Start with the Data We Know Best<\/strong><\/h3>\nWe often make mistakes and don’t know much if anything with certainty. So we should have some method in our attempts to make sense of life.<\/p>\n
The philosopher Roderick Chisholm recommends what he calls \u201cepistemological particularism.\u201d[2]<\/a> This method privileges experiences we know best when trying to makes sense of life. It begins with ideas that seem most obvious.<\/p>\nSee my essay in this…<\/p><\/div>\n
Epistemological particularism doesn\u2019t claim we can be certain descriptions of our experience are 100% accurate. But we can be more confident in first-person data — especially data inevitably expressed in our living — than data we know from a third-person perspective.<\/p>\n
This method should lead us to affirm the reality of human freedom. Of course, some people interpret studies in neuroscience (and other sciences) as indicating humans are not free. For several reasons, I think such interpretations mistaken. But my first step in addressing claims about determinism is to argue we should feel more confident of the truthfulness of first-person data \u2013 our inescapable personal experiences \u2013 than the data of neuroscience. Scientists obtain neuroscience data through third-person perspectives.<\/p>\n
I\u2019m not rejecting neuroscience as a discipline. In my view, neuroscientists should pursue their research with passion. The discipline has generated helpful insights, and I have friends contributing in this field. But we must avoid conclusions the data does not and, I think, could not in principle support. For an accessible philosophical defense of freewill in light of neuroscience research, see Alfred Mele’s work.[3]<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\nIs Free Will Just Common Sense?<\/strong><\/h3>\nSome call those beliefs that are self-evidently true and inevitably expressed in our actions \u201ccommon sense.\u201d Philosophers such as Thomas Reid, GE Moore, and Alfred North Whitehead argued for commonsense ideas.[4]<\/a> In terms of freedom, common sense says we all act freely — at least sometimes.<\/p>\nWe use \u201ccommon sense\u201d\u00a0 to describe ideas that are not inevitably expressed in our lives, however. To some people, for instance, it’s common sense black men should not marry white women. Others think it’s common sense that the New England Patriots are the greatest football team. Some think common sense tells us God controls our lives. Because these ideas are not truly common nor expressed inevitably in our actions, the phrase “common sense” can be misleading and then dismissed as unhelpful or dangerous.<\/p>\n
David Ray Griffin distinguishes between ideas some call common sense and what he calls \u201chard-core\u201d and soft-core commonsense ideas.[5]<\/a> We inevitably presuppose hard-core commonsense ideas in our practice. We don\u2019t inevitably presuppose soft-core commonsense ideas. Soft-core commonsense ideas might include the (wrong) belief that black men and white women shouldn\u2019t marry, the (debatable) belief that New England has the best football team, or the (arguably harmful) belief that God controls creation.<\/p>\nWe can deny soft-core commonsense ideas and still live consistently. Hard-core commonsense ideas cannot consistently be denied in our practice.<\/p>\n
Free Will is an Experiential Nonnegotiable<\/strong><\/h3>\nI\u2019ve come to call the ideas that we inescapably live out \u201cexperiential nonnegotiables.\u201d We must accept the truth of experiential nonnegotiables if we want to speak adequately about the way the world works.<\/p>\n
We contradict ourselves if we say we act one way and then act differently. We commit what J\u00fcrgen Habermas calls \u201cperformative contradictions:\u201d our performance in life contradicts our statements about what life is like.[6]<\/a><\/p>\nIn terms of freedom, we contradict ourselves if we claim we are not free and then live as if we act freely<\/em>. Our words don\u2019t match our actions; we are experiential hypocrites. At least for most humans if not all, genuine but limited freedom is an experiential nonnegotiable.<\/p>\nI could list other experiential nonnegotiables (e.g., there is a world external to myself). Myy point for this essay is the inevitable experience of freedom in our lives provides strong justification to think humans have genuine but limited freedom.<\/p>\nWe contradict ourselves if we claim we're not free and then live as if we act freely. We are experiential hypocrites. <\/a><\/span>Share on X<\/a><\/span>\n
See my essay in this…<\/p><\/div>\n
Epistemological particularism doesn\u2019t claim we can be certain descriptions of our experience are 100% accurate. But we can be more confident in first-person data — especially data inevitably expressed in our living — than data we know from a third-person perspective.<\/p>\n
This method should lead us to affirm the reality of human freedom. Of course, some people interpret studies in neuroscience (and other sciences) as indicating humans are not free. For several reasons, I think such interpretations mistaken. But my first step in addressing claims about determinism is to argue we should feel more confident of the truthfulness of first-person data \u2013 our inescapable personal experiences \u2013 than the data of neuroscience. Scientists obtain neuroscience data through third-person perspectives.<\/p>\n
I\u2019m not rejecting neuroscience as a discipline. In my view, neuroscientists should pursue their research with passion. The discipline has generated helpful insights, and I have friends contributing in this field. But we must avoid conclusions the data does not and, I think, could not in principle support. For an accessible philosophical defense of freewill in light of neuroscience research, see Alfred Mele’s work.[3]<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n Some call those beliefs that are self-evidently true and inevitably expressed in our actions \u201ccommon sense.\u201d Philosophers such as Thomas Reid, GE Moore, and Alfred North Whitehead argued for commonsense ideas.[4]<\/a> In terms of freedom, common sense says we all act freely — at least sometimes.<\/p>\n We use \u201ccommon sense\u201d\u00a0 to describe ideas that are not inevitably expressed in our lives, however. To some people, for instance, it’s common sense black men should not marry white women. Others think it’s common sense that the New England Patriots are the greatest football team. Some think common sense tells us God controls our lives. Because these ideas are not truly common nor expressed inevitably in our actions, the phrase “common sense” can be misleading and then dismissed as unhelpful or dangerous.<\/p>\n David Ray Griffin distinguishes between ideas some call common sense and what he calls \u201chard-core\u201d and soft-core commonsense ideas.[5]<\/a> We inevitably presuppose hard-core commonsense ideas in our practice. We don\u2019t inevitably presuppose soft-core commonsense ideas. Soft-core commonsense ideas might include the (wrong) belief that black men and white women shouldn\u2019t marry, the (debatable) belief that New England has the best football team, or the (arguably harmful) belief that God controls creation.<\/p>\n We can deny soft-core commonsense ideas and still live consistently. Hard-core commonsense ideas cannot consistently be denied in our practice.<\/p>\n I\u2019ve come to call the ideas that we inescapably live out \u201cexperiential nonnegotiables.\u201d We must accept the truth of experiential nonnegotiables if we want to speak adequately about the way the world works.<\/p>\n We contradict ourselves if we say we act one way and then act differently. We commit what J\u00fcrgen Habermas calls \u201cperformative contradictions:\u201d our performance in life contradicts our statements about what life is like.[6]<\/a><\/p>\n In terms of freedom, we contradict ourselves if we claim we are not free and then live as if we act freely<\/em>. Our words don\u2019t match our actions; we are experiential hypocrites. At least for most humans if not all, genuine but limited freedom is an experiential nonnegotiable.<\/p>\n I could list other experiential nonnegotiables (e.g., there is a world external to myself). Myy point for this essay is the inevitable experience of freedom in our lives provides strong justification to think humans have genuine but limited freedom.<\/p>\nWe contradict ourselves if we claim we're not free and then live as if we act freely. We are experiential hypocrites. <\/a><\/span>Share on X<\/a><\/span>\nIs Free Will Just Common Sense?<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Free Will is an Experiential Nonnegotiable<\/strong><\/h3>\n