{"id":6521,"date":"2023-02-10T13:48:41","date_gmt":"2023-02-10T20:48:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/index.php\/blog\/archives\/"},"modified":"2023-02-10T13:52:29","modified_gmt":"2023-02-10T20:52:29","slug":"gods-nature-qualifies-omnipotence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/index.php\/blog\/archives\/gods-nature-qualifies-omnipotence","title":{"rendered":"God’s Nature Qualifies Omnipotence"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

As part of a book I’m writing called The Death of Omnipotence …and Birth of Amipotence<\/em>, I’m devoting a whole chapter to the qualifications scholars make to omnipotence. The chapter is called “Death by a Thousand Qualifications.” <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the title of the chapter suggests, I note thousands of qualifications necessary to make any sense of omnipotence. In this essay, I address one category: qualifications to omniop[tence that come from God’s nature.<\/p>\n\n\n

\n
\"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

God Can’t Do All Things Possible<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Thomas Aquinas admits to being confused, for instance, about \u201cthe precise meaning of the word \u2018all\u2019 when we say that God can do all things.\u201d Consequently, he says, it\u2019s \u201cdifficult to explain in what omnipotence precisely consists.\u201d[1]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In response to various concerns, nearly every serious theologian says God cannot do some things. God can\u2019t. Some of those qualifications pertain to who God is, or what most call \u201cthe divine nature.\u201d[1]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thomas Aquinas is not exactly right when also says \u201cGod can do all things that are possible; and for this reason, He is said to be omnipotent.\u201d[2]<\/a> After all, many actions are possible for creatures but impossible for God. So God can\u2019t do all<\/em> things possible.[3]<\/a> For example, biblical writers say it\u2019s impossible for God to lie (Heb. 6:18<\/a>; Tit. 1:2). In this case, you and I can do something God cannot.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We need to explore qualifications to omnipotence that arise from God\u2019s nature. For various reasons, these qualifications are important. Most, if not all, fall under the general biblical claim that \u201cGod cannot deny himself\u201d (2 Tim. 2:13). These are impossibilities for God given who God is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Augustine Identifies Things God Can’t Do<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

To begin exploring these activities, I turn to Augustine. He offers the following qualifications to divine power: \u201cI can tell you the sort of things [God] could not do,\u201d he writes. \u201c[God] cannot die, He cannot sin, He cannot lie, He cannot be deceived. Such things He cannot.\u201d[4]<\/a> Let me list these four like this\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot die.
God cannot sin.
God cannot lie.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot be deceived.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Other theologians add qualifications.[5]<\/a> Many arise from the superlative attributes God possesses. For instance, a God who exists necessarily cannot decide to stop existing. The God present to all cannot be absent someplace. An omniscient God cannot be ignorant of some fact. A God who by nature loves everyone and everything cannot be unloving toward someone or something.[6]<\/a> We might list these qualifications this way\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot decide to stop existing.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot be omnipresent and absent somewhere.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot be omniscient and ignorant of some fact.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot be all-loving but fail to love someone.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

God Can’t Choose Evil<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The question of the priority of choice or love leads some theologians to say God can\u2019t choose not to love. God must<\/em> love. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jacob Arminius makes the point when he argues \u201cGod is not freely good; that is, he is not good by the mode of liberty, but by that of natural necessity.\u201d For \u201cif God be freely good,\u201d Arminius continues, \u201che can be or can be made not good.\u201d In fact, Arminius considered blasphemous the idea God chooses to love.[7]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Divine omnipotence must be qualified to say God cannot choose evil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Qualifications Forces Scripture Choices<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Believers may think these qualifications inconsequential. \u201cIsn\u2019t it true by definition that God always exists, is omnipresent, and loves everyone?\u201d they might ask. \u201cWhy should anyone think of these as limits to divine power?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If we compare these qualifications with scripture, however, we\u2019ll see why they matter. In fact, affirming each forces us to make choices when interpreting conflicting biblical passages. Do we accept as true passages that say God never harms, for instance, or those that say God sometimes harms? Do we accept passages that say God loves everyone or those that say God only loves some? Do we accept passages that say God sometimes abandons us or those that say God never leaves us? And so on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Suppose we say God can <\/em>choose to stop loving everyone. Or God can <\/em>choose to be absent from some situations. These choices commit us to other qualifications. The God who can choose to stop loving or not be present is unable necessarily to love all and necessarily be present to all. When it comes to God\u2019s nature, in other words, we can\u2019t avoid qualifying omnipotence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

God Can’t Make An Equal<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Another set of qualifications to divine abilities is necessary to account for God\u2019s uniqueness. Most theologians are monotheists and believe God has no divine colleagues. This means, say many, God is unable to create an equal or superior deity. Peter of Lombard identifies this issue when he says, \u201cGod could not generate someone better than himself, for there is nothing better than God.\u201d[8]<\/a> We can identify a myriad of ways God cannot create someone better.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot create someone smarter than God.<\/em><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot create someone stronger than God.<\/em><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot create someone more loving than God.<\/em><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot create an infinite divine being.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Classical Theism Says God Can’t…<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Theologians differ among themselves on some qualifications of omnipotence, of course. What is often called \u201cclassical theism\u201d adds modifications that I would not.[9]<\/a> For instance, classical theism makes these qualifications to omnipotence\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot decide to change, because God is immutable.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot be affected by creatures, because God is impassible.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot experience the flow of time, because God is timeless.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot feel emotion in response to creatures, because God has no such emotions.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

God Can’t Create Logical Principles<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The limits to omnipotence I\u2019ve noted above appeal to principles to which even God seems subject. \u201cWhere are these principles?\u201d we might ask. \u201cWho created them?\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A common answer and one I accept says no one \u2013 not even God \u2013 created them.[10]<\/a> These principles \u2013 often called \u201cPlatonic forms\u201d \u2013 are everlastingly part of God\u2019s uncreated nature. For God to deny them, therefore, God would have to deny Godself\u2026 which God cannot do.[11]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Many qualifications I\u2019ve noted fall under the broad claim that God did not create Godself. And this means, in part, God did not and cannot create God\u2019s own nature. This inability is widely assumed and affirmed among theistic scholars.[12]<\/a> Or as Charles Taliaferro puts it, \u201cthe state of affairs of God\u2019s being God<\/em> is not something God could have brought about or altered.\u201d[13]<\/a> Let me list it simply\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

God cannot create God\u2019s nature.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

As I said at the outset, this is a small portion of my philosophical chapter in The Death of Omnipotence<\/em>. I list many <\/em>other kinds and types of qualifications to omnipotence. Given the sheer number, we should consider omnipotence to die the death of a thousand qualifications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, <\/em>I (Westminster, Md: Christian Classics, 1981), 1a, Q. 25, A. 3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> Among important books exploring the meaning of God\u2019s nature, see Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? <\/em>(Milwaukee, 1980).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> Thomas Aquinas,\u00a0Summa Theologica, 1a, Q. 25, A. 3. Given what Aquinas says in other discussions, I suspect he\u2019d agree with my criticism. He should have said, \u201c\u2018God can do all things,\u2019 is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible for God.\u201d But even adding the qualification \u201cfor God\u201d is unhelpful, because it begs the question about the nature of God and how that nature limits divine abilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> This undermines Aquinas\u2019 recommendation that it \u201cis better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them.\u201d (Ibid.) Many things can <\/em>be done, just not by God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a> Augustine, Sermo de symbolo ad catechumenos<\/em> 2 (CChr.SL 46, 185-6, PL), 40. Augustine strangely adds that if God could do such activities, \u201cHe would not be omnipotent.\u201d This makes little sense, however. Imagine me saying Tom can\u2019t speak all languages because if he could, he would not be omnipotent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a> Stephen Charnock offers a good discussion of things God cannot do. See his The Existence and Attributes of God, <\/em>Vol. 2(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book, reprint 1996 [1853]), 1-40.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a> Wes Morriston ably defends the claim that a morally perfect God cannot be omnipotent. See Morriston, \u201cOmnipotence and necessary moral perfection: are they compatible?\u201d Religious Studies<\/em> 37 (2001), 143\u2013160.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a> Jacob Arminius, \u201cIt is the Summit of Blasphemy to Say God is Freely Good,\u201d in The Works of Jacob Arminius<\/em>, James Nichols, trans. (1828; repr. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1991), 2:33-34.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a> Peter Lombard, I Sentences<\/em>, d. 44, c. 1, 1 (188).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/a> R.T. Mullins offers a concise and well-defended explanation of classical theism in \u201cClassical Theism,\u201d T & T Clark Handbook of Analytic Theology<\/em>, James M. Arcadi and James T. Turner, Jr., eds. (London: Bloomsbury, 2021). See my exploration of classical theism in relation to love in Pluriform Love<\/em>, \u201cClassical Theism and Because of <\/em>Love,\u201d ch. 6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/a> The vast majority of theologians and theistic philosophers think God did not create possibilities, eternal truths, numbers, and abstracta. But we might think they are part of God\u2019s nature or reside in the mind of God. Rene Descartes is among those in the minority view (See Descartes, \u201cLetters to Mersenne, Meslend, and More,\u201d in Philosophical Letters<\/em>, Anthony Kenny, trans. and ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). I recommend Gijsbert van den Brink\u2019s explanation of this issue and the contemporary advocates of Descartes\u2019 position, few though they are. See Van den Brink, Almighty God<\/em>, ch. 2.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/a> See my discussion of this issue in The Uncontrolling Love of God: An Open and Relational Account of Providence <\/em>(Grand Rapids, MI: InterVarsity, 2015), ch. 2.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12]<\/a> Arminius offers a list of things God cannot do in \u201cTwenty-Five Public Disputations,\u201d The Works of James Arminius<\/em>, 135.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13]<\/a> Charles Taliaferro, A Contemporary Philosophy of Religion <\/em>(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 71.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As part of a book I’m writing called The Death of Omnipotence …and Birth of Amipotence, I’m devoting a whole chapter to the qualifications scholars make to omnipotence. The chapter is called “Death by a Thousand Qualifications.” As the title of the chapter suggests, I note thousands of qualifications necessary to make any sense of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[9],"tags":[139,395,7177,7178],"yst_prominent_words":[1017,1279,1922,1932,3684,4807,5503],"class_list":["post-6521","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-open_and_relational_theology","tag-gods-nature","tag-thomas-aquinas","tag-qualifications","tag-abstracta"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6521","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6521"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6521\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6521"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6521"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6521"},{"taxonomy":"yst_prominent_words","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thomasjayoord.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/yst_prominent_words?post=6521"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}